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Abstract — This paper offers a unified framework linking two important debates: First, the 
debate about the respective roles of geography and institutions on economic development; 
Second, the literature on the role of technological change and economic development on 
agricultural intensification and land use changes. We use this framework to study empirically 
deforestation patterns at the rainforest margin.   To this end we specify an empirical model 
that can explore the causal chain ranging from geographic conditions via institutional change 
to economic development and deforestation. We estimate this model using a unique data set 
of villages at the rainforest margin in Indonesia.  Our results show that geography-induced 
institutional change is the key driver of technological change in our villages.  The bad news is 
that some of these processes along the causal chain seem to promote deforestation. The good 
news is that economic development, conditional on these effects, appears to reduce 
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1. Introduction 
The majority of the world’s poor resides in rural areas and derives a significant share 
of their incomes from agriculture.  As has been demonstrated empirically many times in the 
literature, sustainable income growth and poverty reduction in rural areas requires 
improvements in agricultural productivity (e.g. Datt and Ravallion, 1996, 2002; Byerlee, Diao 
and Jackson, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Grimm, Klasen and McKay, 2007; Thurlow 
and Wobst, 2007, World Bank, 2007). Key to such agricultural productivity improvements are 
improvements in agricultural production technologies. Thus the critical question arises what 
are the key drivers of technological change in agriculture.  This is of particular relevance in 
regions where land is still available for conversion to agricultural use, as these are typically 
the areas where individual property rights are absent or not well defined which might 
constrain investments in land improvement and new technologies (see e.g. Binswanger, 
Deininger, and Feder 1995).  This situation applies to much of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also 
significant portions of Latin America and Asia where lowland savannahs and forested areas 
continue to represent an internal land frontier that is available for conversion to agricultural 
uses.   
  At the same time, improving agricultural productivity and incomes at the land frontier 
inevitably begs the question regarding the environmental impact of such developments.  If the 
land frontier consists of rainforest that provide important local and global ecosystem services, 
it is important to determine to what extent economic development and poverty reduction at 
the forest margin will promote or discourage deforestation (e.g. Reardon and Vosti, 1995).   
  The purpose of this paper is to jointly investigate the determinants of economic 
development and deforestation at the rainforest margin using a unique data village data set 
from Indonesia that will allow us to study both drivers of economic development and 
deforestation in a joint empirical framework.
2  Our results suggest that geography- and 
demography-induced institutional change, which in our case is the establishment of property 
rights over agricultural land, are the key drivers of agricultural productivity improvements, 
which in turn determine economic development outcomes at the rainforest margin.  At the 
same time, several of these drivers of economic development themselves promote 
deforestation while the conditional effect of economic development (controlling for its 
drivers) is associated with reduced deforestation.   
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the conceptual 
framework, also in the context of existing literature on the subject.  The following section 
describes the data, the setting, and the econometric method.  Section 4 focuses on the results, 
while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
When studying the literature on determinants of economic development in general, and 
development in rural settings, seemingly competing hypotheses are invoked. A first strand of 
the literature has debated the respective roles of geography versus institutions for long-term 
economic development.  One group has argues that geography, such as climate, disease 
environment, landform, market access, and soil quality of the cultivated land area, is the 
dominant factor in determining long-term economic development, including particularly 
agricultural development (see e.g. Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1998).  The 
opposing view is that institutions such as property rights and the rule of law are much more 
important determinants of long-term economic progress (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu 
et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004).  Those in the 
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change in agriculture, thereby concentrating on a smaller part of the causal chain investigated 
here.  This paper extends the analysis to economic development and deforestation.     3
latter camp allow, however, for the fact that institutions have evolved endogenously 
responding to, among other things, geographic conditions.  This is done most explicitly in 
Acemoglu  et al. (2001) where geographic conditions, particularly a high disease burden, 
affected European settlement patterns which in turn led to extractive institutions in non-settler 
economies and development-friendly institutions in settler economies. Through historical 
persistence, these institutions still heavily influence the economic fate of nations today.
3 
 
A closely related but rather independent strand of the literature also emphasizes the role of 
endogenous institutional change, this time with an explicit focus on improvements in 
agriculture (North, 1990; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  In this literature, the role of land rights 
has received particular emphasis (e.g. Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder, 1995; Deininger, 
2003). According to this argument, land rights would provide security to the land owner, 
would lower the cost of trading land and could be used as collateral for credit. This in turn 
would have a positive impact on investment in land improvement as well as new and more 
productive cultivation technologies. However, the literature also emphasizes that land rights 
have to be considered as endogenous, responding, among others, to past investment decisions 
in the land, land scarcity, land quality, as well as the differential power of different rural 
groups (e.g. Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder, 1995; Rozelle and Li, 1998; Besley, 1995; 
Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2002). The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of land 
rights is quite mixed, as will be discussed below. 
 
A third strand of the literature emphasizes population size and density, and associated 
pressure on land, inducing technological improvements or the adoption of existing 
technologies (see e.g. Boserup 1981; Kremer, 1993; Klasen and Nestmann, 2006).  
 
These three strands of the literature have evolved quite independently and there are only few 
studies that explicitly test the relative importance or the inter-relationships between these 
competing hypotheses. In this paper, we suggest a theoretical argument which links these 
three potential explanations and then proceed to test these linkages empirically. We argue that 
migration to a land frontier is driven by a favorable geography, and that high migration and 
associated population growth in turn intensify land pressure in these areas. Land pressure 
induces communities to opt for land rights, which in turn increase the incentive of farmers to 
invest in agricultural technology. Eventually, agricultural technology enhances agricultural 
growth which in turns drives economic development and poverty reduction. In short, 
endogenously generated institutional change is the core element of our transmission channel 
from geography to economic development. 
 
In this sense, our argument is a “micro version” of the “institutions hypothesis” discussed 
above and focuses on the transmission channels from geography-induced institutional to 
economic development. As the debates about the “institutions hypothesis” have usually been 
based on cross-country regressions where questions about parameter heterogeneity, 
unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity cannot easily be controlled for, we believe there is 
value added to consider these linkages at a micro level, where parameter heterogeneity and 
endogeneity are likely to be less relevant. In addition, it allows examining in more detail what 
kind of institutions matter and how in turn these are determined. In this paper we focus on 
legal government titles for agricultural land and argue that those are a critical driver of 
agricultural development. We also show that the introduction of land titles at the village level 
is driven by migration and geography. Thus, similar to Acemoglu et al. (2001) and others we 
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attribute to geography an indirect role on economic development through its effect on 
institutions.  
 
The causal chain from geography to economic development we have in mind is as follows. 
We argue that immigration to the villages in our study region is driven by the geographic 
features of these villages, with favorable geography (such as high quality land, favorable 
climatic conditions, good accessibility) attracting immigrants. Villages with relatively high 
immigration in turn experience population pressure on increasingly scarce land resources. 
Land pressure and associated conflicts induces villages to regulate their land market and to 
opt for land rights, for which there is a demand-driven system of land rights in place in 
Indonesia (see below).  In line with a large literature on this topic, land rights increase 
incentives and means for agricultural productivity improvements as farmers are able to 
capture the returns to long-term investments through higher productivity or higher land values 
and can use the land as collateral for credit (e.g. Braselle et al. 2002).  Tenure security is 
particularly important in our study area because the main innovation in agriculture is the 
cultivation of cacao, a perennial crop, which starts to generate returns from the third year 
onwards. Eventually, agricultural technology enhances agricultural growth and economic 
development.
4   
 
The reader might notice some similarity between our hypothesis and the one by Boserup 
(1981) mentioned above. Boserup (1981) argued convincingly that demographic pressure and 
associated food shortages would induce technological improvements or the adoption of 
existing technologies. A rising population density would force individuals to modify the mode 
of land use and to employ progressively modern agricultural technologies. The argument put 
forward in our paper is consistent with Boserup’s line of reasoning, but the crucial issue is, 
that we assume that institutional change is the critical intervening variable between population 
and technology. Without that institutional change investments in new technologies will not 
take place for the reasons given above.  
 
Regarding the link between this causal chain and possible deforestation, the literature 
suggests competing influences (see Maertens et al. 2006; Angelson, 1999; Angelsen et al., 
2001).  On the one hand, deforestation and environmental degradation more generally is seen 
as a consequence of population pressure, poverty, and poor technologies, where people are 
pushed onto marginal lands and/or convert forests for agricultural use.  Conversely, 
deforestation can also result from profitable income-earning opportunities in agriculture that 
induces the expansion of a land frontier, i.e. deforestation is a result of pull factors to the 
rainforest margin.  As has been suggested in the literature (e.g. Maertens et al. 2006, Angelsen 
et al., 2001), the type of technological change might matter as well, with labor-saving 
technological improvements favoring forest clearing while land-saving technologies 
discouraging land conversion.  Some of these forces have actually been investigated using the 
same data from Indonesia.  In particular, Maertens et al. (2006) examine the impact of land- 
and labor-saving technologies in rice production, as well as population pressure on land 
expansion in a set of Indonesian villages.  They find that population pressure and labor-saving 
technologies promote deforestation while land-saving ones reduce it.
5 
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5 Our study differs from their approach by explicitly considering the drivers of technological 
change, by looking directly at deforestation rates (rather than land use changes as a proxy), by 
considering more covariates, and by including an explicit panel dimension in the analysis.   5
 
  This literature thus suggests that many of the determinants along our causal change, 
including favorable geography, population pressure, land rights, technological change as well 
as economic development could all have an impact on land-use changes and deforestation 
rates and that it is therefore important to consider the direct and indirect effects of these 
determinants in our empirical analysis.        
 
3. Data, study context, and econometric method 
 
3.1. Data  
The data used in this analysis consists of a village survey matched to GIS data on 
forest cover and its changes.  The village survey we use was conducted during March to July 
in 2001 in the Lore Lindu region. This region includes the Lore Lindu National Park and the 
five surrounding sub-districts. It is situated south of Palu, the provincial capital of Central 
Sulawesi/Indonesia. The survey is part of an international and interdisciplinary research 
program known as “Stability of Rain Forest Margins” (STORMA) which studies the 
determinants of biodiversity and land use in this region and how such biodiversity can be 
protected through appropriate socioeconomic mechanisms. For the survey 80 of the 119 
villages in the region were selected using a stratified random sampling method (Zeller, 
Schwarze and van Rheenen, 2002). The survey collected data on current and past 
demographics, land use practices and technology adoption, conservation issues, infrastructure 
and qualitative information on income and well-being. Additional information on geographic 
features was taken from secondary data sources and added to the data set by Maertens, Zeller 
and Birner (2006). It is important to note that the retrospective information on population size, 
migration, land rights and so on was taken from administrative records available in each 
village. Therefore this information is very reliable and not based on possibly biased recall 
information. Interviews were held not only with the village leader but also with other persons 
who had good knowledge about the surveyed village. This again suggests that the quality of 
the data is quite high. Therefore, using this data set we can - in contrast to most of the macro-
economic studies looking at geography and institutions - use variations in migration flows, 
institutions and the use of technologies over space and time to test our hypothesis. 
Identification of our proposed causal chain is also facilitated by the fact that variations in the 
data over time and space are generally very large (see also below). 
 
This data set was complemented by land cover data derived from satellite images for 
1981 and 2001 (for details see Erasmi and Priess, 2007). The information on forest cover was 
extracted from the land cover data, then aggregated from the pixel level with a resolution of 
500x500m to the village level, and finally merged with the survey data. 
 
3.2 Study context 
3.2.1 The role of agriculture 
The Lore Lindu region is rural. 87% of the 33,000 households living in the region 
depend economically on agriculture. 15% of the total area—excluding the National Park—is 
used for agricultural production. The rest of the area is mainly grasslands and forests. The 
principal food crop is sawah rice (‘sawah’ means wet rice field or paddy). Important cash 
crops are cocoa and coffee. Households mainly operate as smallholders and with very few 
exceptions there are almost no large plantations in the region (see Maertens et al., 2006). 
Logging is mainly done informally (mainly for the conversion of forest land into cacao plots 
and not for selling the wood) and has then only a marginal importance for the local 
population. 
   6
3.2.2 Migration 
During the past decades a significant part of the immigration into the study region has taken 
place from the south and middle-west of Sulawesi to the north-east of the Lore Lindu region, 
in particular to the districts of Palolo, Sigi Biromaru and Lore Utara. Some immigration has 
also taken place within so called ‘transmigration programs’, organized by the government 
mainly during the 1960s and 1970s. These programs resettled people in particular from the 
islands Java, Bali and Lombok in Central-Sulawesi. The places were chosen according to 
factors such as soil fertility and land availability (Faust, Maertens, Weber et al., 2003). Most 
of these migrants have today returned and the programs are seen as having failed. In our 
sample only three villages were affected by such migration programs during the period 1990-
2001. We excluded these three villages from our sample. No village was affected by these 
programs during the 1980s.  
 
3.2.3 Land rights 
Land rights became more and more widespread over time in the Lore Lindu region. Some 
villages have had land rights since the early 1980s.  Others introduced them only recently and 
a significant share of the villages is even today without such titles. In the villages where land 
titles exist they were in most cases established in the framework of the land certification 
schemes PRONA (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria) and PRODA (Program Proyek Agraria 
Daerah), which can provide ownership rights to land holders. These schemes were created by 
the Indonesian Government in 1981. However, no central or regional government beyond the 
village level ever enforced land titling and land redistribution in the study area using these 
mechanisms. PRONA/PRODA is rather an available scheme which can be used if there is a 
demand and the willingness to opt for land titling by villagers (Siagian and Neldysavrino, 
2007). The costs of land titling under these schemes have to be borne by the villagers. The 
process of land titling needs collective action by the villagers and usually starts with a 
proposal to the land administration office. This implies that the process of land titling is - 
consistent with our hypothesis - demand and not supply driven. In villages where land rights 
were established outside of PRONA/PRODA-scheme, the titles were usually issued by village 
leaders, but they also usually provide ownership rights and not only management rights. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that formal and informal credit is available in the study 
region and that titled land is frequently used as collateral (Nuryartono, Schwarze and Zeller, 
2004). 
 
3.3 Estimation Strategy 
First, we show that in the Lore Lindu Region agricultural technology is an important driver of 
agricultural household income. Although the empirical literature has shown many times that 
technology drives agricultural development, we think it is important to show that this link is 
also significant in our case. Therefore, we estimate using ordinary least-squares (OLS) the 
following equation: 
 
i i i i X A Y ε γ α µ + + + =
' ' , (1a) 
 
where the index i stands for the villages. Since the survey does not provide any information 
on village mean income or alike, we use the percentage of all houses (used for the purpose of 
human residence) in each village built from stone, bricks or cement. Throughout the Lore 
Lindu region having a stone house is seen as sign of prosperity and wealth and therefore that 
variable should be a good measure of the villager’s living standard, Y. As can be seen in Table 
1, the share of stone houses varies significantly in our data set and therefore should contain   7
enough information about differences in well-being across villages and over time during the 
period we look at.
6  
 
As measures of agricultural technology (A) we use the existence of technical or semi-technical 
irrigation systems (usually village schemes), the construction of terraces as well as the use of 
fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seeds in the villages. Irrigation systems are only reported 
for villages with sawah rice fields. This concerns 70 out of the 77 villages and only those are 
included in the respective regressions. Likewise, terraces are only relevant for villages which 
have fields on steep slopes. This concerns 46 out of the 77 villages and again only those are 
included in the relevant regressions. One should also note that irrigation and terraces are 
rather long term investments, whereas fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds are short term 
investments. For the latter land rights matter if land can be used as collateral for credit. In the 
study region this is the case and credits are an important device to finance inputs such as 
fertilizer in the pre-harvest period. 
 
The vector X stands for additional control variables such as the male per agricultural 
land ratio in the village, the share of the village population between 19 and 45 years old (both 
measures of labor availability/abundance) and whether the village had connection to drinking 
water in 1990. We also control for adult education, which we measure by a dummy variable 
indicating whether the village had a primary school in 1980.
7  
 
In the basic specification the dependant variable is measured in 2001 and all explanatory 
variables, including technology, in the mid-nineties to allow for a time lag until these 
investments translate into higher incomes. Given that we have for most of our variables also 
retrospective information, we estimate Equation (1a) also with a panel fixed-effects estimator 
to control for all time-invariant unobserved village effects: 
 
it it it i it X A Y ε γ α µ + + + =
' ' . (1b) 
 
At this stage, we do not address the issue of a possible simultaneity bias of technology 
and income, but we will return to this issue below.  All we want to show in the estimation of 
the equation above is that there is, as it has been illustrated in many other contexts a number 
of times, a clear impact of technology on income. We are however not interested in producing 
a precise unbiased estimate of this effect, which we will deal with below. Central to our 




                                                 
6 It should also be noted that stones and bricks are often made or collected in the surroundings 
of the villages and hence, no road is necessary to bring them. Also, heavy materials including 
stones are in the Lore Lindu region traditionally and still frequently transported using 
buffalos, donkeys, horses or motorcycles. Given that labor is very cheap, transport time plays 
no important role. In 2001, among the 15 villages without any stone house, 11 are not 
accessible by car and 4 are accessible. Conversely, 8 villages among the 19 villages which are 
not accessible by car, have a significant share of stone houses. 
7 We also used a few other control variables but they did not change the results. Due to the 
relatively small sample size, we cannot include a large set of control variables in a single 
estimation. 
8 The problem is also partly mitigated by using lagged technology in the income regression.   8
To identify the drivers of technology adoption and to test for the hypothesis we developed in 
Section 2, we estimate then step-by-step the impact of geography on migration, the impact of 
migration on land rights and the impact of land rights on technology.
9  
The causal impact of geography on migration is tested by estimating the following equation: 
 
Ii I i I i I i X G M υ γ β λ + + + =
' ' , (2) 
 
Migration (M) is measured alternatively through two variables: first through the net 
immigration rate to each village over the period 1980 to 1990 and, second, through the 
logarithm of village population size in 1980. The former is measured as the difference of 
immigrating and emigrating households over a given period divided by the number of 
households in the village at the beginning of that period. It should be noted that we take here 
the household as the observation unit and not the individual, since rural-rural migration is in 
this context usually household migration. Village population size in 1980 is used as a proxy 
for immigration prior to 1980, but of course it includes past natural population growth as well. 
However, the latter should vary much less over the villages in the Lore Lindu region than 
migration. Therefore, we are confident that we capture with this variable reasonably well the 
effect of migration. As an additional regressor in the net-migration rate equation we use the 
population density in each village (population divided by total land area, excluding forest) in 
1980 to control for the possibility that denser villages attract more or less migrants. Finally we 
control whether the village had a connection to drinking water and to electricity in 1980. Both 
might have an impact on immigration rates. 
 
As measures of the geographic features of the villages (G) we use the share of agricultural 
land which is on steep slopes,
10 the year of the last drought as a measure of the frequency of 
droughts, the logarithm of the village altitude above sea level in meters and whether the 
village was accessible by car in 1980.
11  
 
To show that migration enhances land titling, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Ri R i i R R i X M R υ γ β λ + + + =
' , (3a) 
 
where R is a dichotomous variable which takes the value one if legal government titles for 
land exist in village i. Control variables included in X are adult education and the availability 
                                                 
9 In this paper we only model the causal chain as a series of OLS regressions.  In Grimm and 
Klasen (2008), they are also examined IV estimators in the context of 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimators.   
10 A slope of more than 30° is considered as ‘steep’. 
11 The accessibility by car variable is not intended to measure current infrastructure access. By 
using historical road access, it is rather included as a measure of geographical remoteness and 
as a measure of geographic traits which make the construction of a road more or less easy.
11 
The first roads in Central Sulawesi can be traced back to the colonial period and were indeed 
built where geography made it easy. Roads through rougher areas as for example the road to 
Barisi in the South-East of the Lore-Lindu region were built after 1980. In our dataset, 
accessibility by car in 1980 is negatively correlated with the share of agricultural land on 
steep slopes (correlation coefficient: -0.25), this also supports the view that this variable is a 
good measure of geography.  See Grimm and Klasen (2008) fur further discussion on the 
relevance of these geographic variables. 
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of a credit program in the village during the past twenty years. Higher adult education might 
facilitate the village action needed to submit a proposal for land titling. The availability of a 
credit program might increase the demand for land titling such that land can be used as 
collateral. It should be noted that in all equations above and in those which follow, we operate 
with appropriate time lags that is we use migration prior to land titling, and land titling prior 
to technology adoption.  
 
To control for village specific time invariant effects, we estimate Equation (3a) also with a 
panel fixed-effects estimator: 
 
Rit R it it R Ri it X M R υ γ β λ + + + =
' . (3b) 
 
The last element in our causal chain is the hypothesized positive impact of land rights on 
technology adoption. We estimate the following equation: 
 
Ai A i i A A i X R A υ γ β λ + + + =
' , (4a) 
 
where A stands for the same technology variables than in Equation (1). Again we estimate this 
equation also with a fixed-effects estimator: 
 
Ait A it it A Ai it X R A υ γ β λ + + + =
'  (4b) 
 
In the last step on the causal chain from geography to economic development, we revisit 
equation 1a) and estimate it using 2SLS, this time using geography as an instrument for 
technological change to deal with the problem of endogeneity.   The particular specification 
we use is   
 







G i i G G i X G A
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
+ + = γ β λ
'        (5) 
 
To test the impact of the causal chain on our deforestation rates between 1980 and 2001, we 
need to consider that some of the drivers of economic development (such as population 
pressure) have a direct impact on changes in the forest cover (FC) while others will have an 
indirect effect via economic development.  The easiest way to capture this effect is to specify 
an OLS regression of forest losses at the village level on the drivers of economic development 
as well as economic development itself.  This way one can then later identify (and quantify) 
direct effects of these factors using the OLS regression and consider indirect effects by 
examining the earlier regressions and the impact of economic development on deforestation.
12 
 
i i i i i i i Y lb A ld A M G FC ε φ δ γ β α µ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆
' ' ' ' ' ) ( ) (     (6) 
 
Where the delta-signs stand for change over time and A(ld) and A(lb) distinguish between 
land-saving (A(ld)) and labor-saving (A(lb)) technological change.  We use the use of hand-
                                                 
12 See Klasen (2002) for an example of such a path analysis.     10
tractors as an indicator or labor-saving technological change and consider the changes in the 
package of modern seeds, fertilizer and pesticide use as one indicator of land-saving 
technological change, and the implementation of terraces as another one.
13   We will consider 
both the effect of economic growth (as shown in the equation) and, alternatively, the level of 
economic development as a factor influencing deforestation.   
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all key and the principal control variables 
in our analysis. As the statistics show, migration, land rights, technology adoption, and 
income growth show a sizable variation across villages and over time. Both should help to 
identify the parameters we are interested in. This spatial and intertemporal variation also 
shows that our region of analysis is a region under substantial transformation.  Regarding 
forest loss, the forest cover in the villages is reduced by about 7 percentage points between 
1980 and 2001 (from about 77% forest cover to 70%).  This is somewhat smaller than the 
average for Indonesia and might also be affected by the protective function of the national 
park (see Schwarze et al. 2008).  But also here there is significant variation and thus it is very 
interesting and important to understand the drivers of this differential in deforestation rates.   
 
4. Results 
4.1. Technology and economic development 
Table 2 reports regressions of Equation (1a), i.e. of the share of houses built from stone, 
bricks or cement, our measure of economic development, on various variables of agricultural 
technology. 
 
Columns (1)–(5) show that all used technology variables have a positive and highly 
significant impact on economic performance. Note that technology is measured in 1995 and 
the share of houses in 2001, taking into account the time it takes until new technologies can 
translate into durably higher incomes. Column (6) shows a regression in which we use 
irrigation and a dummy variable as technology variables - the latter taking the value one if the 
village used fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds simultaneously
14 - and, as an additional 
control variable, the average share of households who emigrated from the village between 
1995 and 2001. This latter variable is insignificant and thus makes it unlikely that the share of 
stone houses is strongly related to remittances coming from former villagers who migrated to 
the city.  
 
Column (7) introduces as additional controls the ratio between the male population and the 
total size of agricultural land in 1995, the share of villagers between 19 and 45 years old, 
adult education approximated by the availability of a primary school in the village in 1980, 
and a dummy variable whether the village had in 1990 a drinking water system. Using the 
results of that regression we find that on average in a village with irrigation the share of stone 
houses is higher by almost 20 percentage points than in a village without irrigation. Using 
fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds simultaneously increases this share again by 23 
percentage points. This model explains more than 62% of the total variance in the data. We 
also estimated the models presented in columns (1)-(7) with maximum likelihood using a 
generalized linear model which might be more appropriate given that our dependant variable 
                                                 
13 As terraces are only relevant in some of the villages, we include a variable “terraces not 
relevant” as an additional regressor in order to be able to use the full data set.  Please note also 
that regression (6) is focused on those villages where there was some forest cover in 1980; 
this led to the exclusion of three villages from the analysis. 
14 Note that these techniques are often adopted in a sequence, starting with irrigation, 
followed first by fertilizer, second by pesticides and last by improved seeds.   11
is a ratio bounded between 0 and 1. It turned out that the standard errors were nearly identical 
and hence we decided to stick to the simpler OLS model. 
 
Given the relatively small sample size we are of course constrained by the number of control 
variables we can introduce in the model. However, given that we have for the relevant 
variables observations over at least four different points in time (usually 1980, 1990, 1995 and 
2001), we can estimate our model also using fixed effects as specified in Equation (1b) and 
thus at least control for the influence of all time-invariant village effects (including the 
potential role played by geography). Columns (8)–(13) show that all results hold and that 
most of the technology coefficients have a similar magnitude.
15  
 
Of course all these results might be affected by a possible endogeneity of technology to 
income, although we mitigate this problem by using appropriate lags. In principle proper 
instruments are needed to solve the endogeneity problem satisfactory. We implement this 
below.  At this stage of the analysis we simply conclude, as many other empirical studies have 
done before, that agricultural technology enhances rural development. This motivates us to 
look now at the determinants of technology adoption. We will show that technology is driven 
by migration-induced land rights. 
 
4.2 The transmission channel from geography to technological change 
As discussed in our theoretical part, we assume that technology can be traced back to 
geography, migration and land rights. Table 3 shows the results we obtain if we regress, 
according to Equation (2), migration on our four geographic variables. As mentioned above, 
migration is captured alternatively through two variables: first through the net immigration 
rate to each village over the period 1980 to 1990 and, second, through village population size 
in 1980. The latter is used as a proxy for settlements and immigration prior to 1980. 
 
Regressions (1)-(4) in Table 3 show the effect of each single geographic variable on the net 
immigration rate at the destination. We control for population density in 1980. The 
regressions show that all geographic variables, except village altitude, have a significant 
impact on migration. The signs are always as expected. This also holds if we control for 
infrastructure in 1980, such as the availability of a drinking water system and electricity 
supply, which are both not significant (column (5)). An increase of the share of fields on steep 
slopes by 10 percentage points increases the net immigration rate by 1.2 percentage point. 
This seems to be a reasonable order of magnitude. If we use all geographic variables together 
only the share of agricultural land on steep slopes comes out as significant (column (6)). As 
columns (7)-(11) show, migration prior to 1980 seems in particular to be related to village 
altitude and to accessibility by car in 1980. It should be emphasized that these results are not 
affected by transmigration programs, since we excluded from our analysis, as mentioned 
above, the three villages which received immigrants through these programs during the 
observation period. 
 
In a next step we first analyze using Equation (3a) whether, according to our hypothesis, 
migration has an impact on land rights. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 show that this is the case, 
whether we use only the two migration variables, whether we estimate the model with a linear 
probability model or a non-linear model and whether we include additional controls, such as 
our proxy for adult education and the availability of any credit program (governmental or not) 
in the village during the past 20 years. The results imply that an increase in the immigration 
                                                 
15 In Grimm and Klasen (2008) we also estimate growth rather than level regressions with 
very similar results.   12
rate between 1980 and 1990 by 10% is associated with an increase in the probability of 
having land rights in the village by 1990 by 9.4%. An increase in the village population size 
in 1980 by 1% is in turn associated with 0.3% higher probability of having land rights in the 
village. The model explains almost 32% of the total variance in the data. Here again, we can 
estimate the same model with village fixed effects, as specified in Equation (3b). The results 
are shown in column (4). With respect to the OLS estimation the size of the coefficients 
changes a bit, but the signs remain the same and both coefficients of interest are significant. 
However, while this equation controls for all village-specific time-invariant determinants, we 
are not able to include credit or adult education as time-variant control variables, as these 
variables are only available for one time period.
16  
 
An implication of our theory is that geography should be a relevant instrument for migration.  
This is implemented in Grimm and Klasen (2008) confirming the results shown here.
17   The 
anecdotal evidence also supports the chain of causation we just examined. Villagers told us 
that prospective migrants looking for better living conditions select their destination 
according to geographic characteristics which are a priori favorable for agricultural 
productivity. In most cases migrants then buy or simply get land or a piece of forest to clear 
from the village leader. If this happens too frequently local villagers feel disadvantaged, 
possibly fear expropriation, also claim additional land or believe that the land given to the 
migrants belonged to them. This eventually initiates the process of land titling. Some villagers 
also reported that migrants come with forged land rights ‘bought’ from some higher ‘state 
authority’ and get possibly some land by bribing a local village leader. Again, such a process 
leads communities to demand land security and leads to a demand-driven implementation of 
land rights. 
 
Now we deal with the question whether land rights enhance investment agricultural 
technologies. The results are presented in Table 5. The coefficients in columns (1)-(5) which 
are obtained by estimating Equation (4a) show that land rights in 1990 have a significant and 
positive impact on all technologies we consider. The impact is the highest in the case of 
irrigation systems, which is on average probably the most costly investment and with the 
construction of terraces the only long term investment we look at. The existence of land rights 
increases the probability of investing in an irrigation system by roughly 45%. The impact of 
land rights on the probabilities of finding one of the other investments is between 30% and 
40%. We obtain similar results when we use a probit model for estimation (columns (6)-(8)) 
or when we add further control variables, such as our proxy for adult education, the 
                                                 
16 In additional specifications (available on request) we also add a dummy variable for 
villages planting cocoa as an additional regressor affecting land rights.  As cocoa is a 
perennial cash crop requiring sizable upfront investments, the spread of cocoa might be an 
additional factor affecting land rights.  Indeed this variable has a positive impact but does not 
reduce size and significance of the influence of the migration and population variables on land 
rights; thus our proposed causal chain is not driven by the expansion of cocoa in the area. 
17 To further underpin the causal direction from migration to land rights, we also estimate for 
different periods the reverse relationship, i.e. the impact of land rights on migration. In this 
case we use land rights status at the beginning of the period over which migration is observed. 
The results are shown in Grimm and Klasen (2008). All regressions show, whether we take 
the absolute or the net immigration rate, whether we look at the eighties or the nineties and 
whether we add further controls or not, land rights have never a significant impact on 
migration in the subsequent period. Hence, we conclude that migration and the induced 
population pressure on land resources enhance land rights and not the other way around. 
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availability of any credit program (governmental or not) in the village during the past 10 years 
or whether one can buy in the village any newspaper (columns (9)-(11)). That the availability 
of credit has a significant impact on technology underlines that one of the positive effect 
associated with land rights and technology use might be better access to financial resources if 
land can be used as collateral.
18   
 
The effect of land rights on technology adoption does also hold if we use a fixed-effect 
estimator (Equation (4b)) and thus control again for all time invariant village effects. 
Although as columns (15)-(17) show the coefficients of land rights are a bit smaller than with 
the OLS estimator, they remain all significant.  
 
One might argue that migration has a direct (and not indirect) impact on technology adoption. 
Such a link could exist if migrants bring new technologies to the villages. For example, there 
is evidence that Bugis (or Buginese, an ethnically Malay, nomadic tribe from the south-
western ‘leg’ of Sulawesi) are well experienced in growing coffee. While we do not deny this 
link — in fact it is complementary to our approach — we claim that this is not the dominating 
force. We tested this link also empirically by estimating a regression of technology use in 
1995 on the net migration rate between 1980 and 1990.
19  
 
4.3 Revisiting the technology-growth link 
 
Now that we have demonstrated the causal link from geography via migration and land rights 
to technological change, we can use this insight to control for the endogeneity of the 
regressions shown in Table 2 by using geography as an instrument for technological change.  
This is done in Table 6 where we consider regressions investigating the level of income in 
2001 as well as the growth of incomes between 1995 and 2001 (both proxied by our housing 
variable).  The first stage regression shows that geographic factors indeed have a significant 
influence on technological change and thus are clearly relevant instruments.  The second stage 
regression continues to show a large and significant influence of technological change on 
economic development in the villages, regardless of whether we consider levels or growth 
rates.  While we cannot conclusively show that our instruments fulfill the exclusion 
restriction, an overidentification restriction test supports the validity of the instruments and 
the geographical variables no longer have a separate significant influence on economic 
growth if included in addition in the second stage regression.
20   
 
4.4 Modeling the determinants of deforestation 
 
We now turn to investigating the determinants of deforestation in our village data set.  In 
Table 7 we show two specifications which only differ in their use of economic growth 
(column 1) or income levels in 2001 (column 2) as a covariate.  The results show that many of 
the drivers of economic development indeed also promote deforestation.  Among the 
geography variables, good early infrastructure access (access to car in 1980) and low 
elevation not only help induce economic development, but they also have a direct effect of 
promoting deforestation.  It thus appears that in locations that are accessible and in the 
                                                 
18 Our data does not allow testing the direct impact of land rights on credit use, since only 
credit availability in the village is known and not the percentage of households which actually 
used a credit. However, as mentioned above, Nuryartono, Schwarze and Zeller (2004) report 
that land is frequently used as collateral in the study area. 
19 The results are available on request.   
20 Results are available on request.     14
lowlands, forest conversion is accelerated.  Similar observations relate to population pressure 
which also helped promote technological change but also has a direct and sizable effect in 
promoting deforestation.  In contrast to these trade-offs, infrequent droughts appear to both 
promote technological change and are associated with reduced deforestation.   Here two 
effects might play a role.   First, it could be the case that the absence of severe drought shocks 
reduce encroachment into the rainforest during such shocks to make up for lower yields.
21  
Second, lower drought frequency might alter crop choice and favor irrigated rice over the 
more drought-resistant but extensively farmed cocoa (see Maertens et al. 2006).      
 
The effects of technology also present some trade-offs.  While labor-saving (and thus land-
using) technology is, as expected associated with higher deforestation, the package of modern 
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides also is associated with higher levels deforestation in the 
villages.  It appears that the processes that generate better technologies and higher incomes 
encourage further encroachment.  Only the implementation of terracing leads to lower 
deforestation rates.  This shows that more labor-intensive paddy rice production indeed has a 
forest preserving effect, which is in line with Maertens et al. (2006).   
 
Lastly, it is most interesting to see that, conditional on all other included variables, income 
growth is associated with significantly lower deforestation rates.  Thus a ‘pure’ development 
effect in the sense of rising prosperity appears to lower deforestation.  This might be related to 
a falling dependence on the forest encroachment, and agriculture in general, for a livelihood, 
thus reducing the need to convert forest land.  Interestingly, this effect is only true for 
economic growth, but not income levels in 2001 (or earlier).
22  Thus it is not a pure 
‘prosperity’ effect, but rather an effect of rising prosperity.     
 
Given the fact that many drivers of economic development seem to promote deforestation 
while economic development itself has a forest conserving effect, one can use the regressions 
in tables 3-7 to quantify the net effect of these drivers.  This has to be done with some caution 
as such a quantitative assessment is focused on the point estimates (without considering the 
sizable standard errors) and it neglects the fact that these point estimates are quite sensitive to 
included and excluded control variables and thus depend on the specification used.  It turns 
out that the forest-clearing direct effect is always larger than the forest-conserving indirect 
effect of promoting economic development.  Thus, on net, population growth, the modern 
technology package, better accessibility and lower elevation all end up furthering 
deforestation despite their forest-conserving impact on economic development; but the size of 
the net effect various considerably and is particularly large in the case of population growth 
and road access, while much smaller it the case of low elevation and the modern technology 
package.  Thus for these factors, a trade-off remains between clearing the forest and 
promoting economic development; in contrast this is not the case for terracing and lower 
drought frequency, where a win-win situation appears to be feasible.      
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
As we argued in the beginning of our paper there is considerable debate about the main 
drivers of technological change and economic development in a poor rural economy. The 
                                                 
21 In the time period under investigation, the role of the severe El Nino Southern Oscillation 
event in 1998 which led to a severe drought in Indonesia might have played a significant role.   
22 We also tried specifications with income levels in 1980, 1990 and 1995.  It was never a 
significant determinant of deforestation.     15
literature emphasizes among other things geography, population pressure and institutional 
change as the important determinants without however establishing links between these 
factors. Our hypothesis was that a favorable geography, such as easily cultivable land and a 
low frequency of droughts attract migration, which in turn creates pressure on land. This 
provides an incentive for villagers and village leaders to opt for land rights which in turn 
provide an incentive to invest in agricultural technology, which in turn promotes economic 
development. We tested this hypothesis empirically using longitudinal data on villages 
situated on the Indonesian Island Sulawesi. Employing a system of nested equations and 
controlling for potential endogeneity problems and village fixed effects, we found strong 
empirical support for our hypothesis.  
 
We also find, however, that the many of the factors that promote economic development also 
appear to promote deforestation.. These trade-offs, as well as the identified win-win 
situations, require more careful scrutiny in future work where we hope to integrate another 
round of the village surveys with more recent data on deforestation in our analysis.        16
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of used variables 
 
       
  Invariant  1980 1990 1995 2001 
Development        
Share of houses built from stone    0.054  0.125  0.214  0.317 
    (0.107) (0.180) (0.235) (0.303) 
Deforestation Rate (%  1981-2001)  0.073 
(0.056) 
    
Geography        
Share of agr. land on steep slopes  0.156         
  (0.259)      
Number of years to last drought  9.299         
  (10.664)      
Village accessible by car    0.597  0.714  0.727  0.753 
Altitude in m (level above sea)  647.3         
  (339.9)      
Demography        
Net immigration rate of housh.
a)    0.021 0.021 0.014   
    (0.131) (0.066) (0.100)   
Village population size    713.5  913.8  987.2  1101.9 
    (694.1) (821.1) (857.3) (876.4) 
 Change in Household Number (%)  1.34 
(1.65) 
    
Land rights    0.091 0.351 0.403 0.636 
Technology use        
Irrigation system available
 b)    0.200 0.329 0.371 0.514 
Fertilizer  use    0.403 0.584 0.649 0.727 
Pesticides  use    0.455 0.636 0.753 0.948 
Improved  seeds  use    0.286 0.416 0.545 0.870 
Terraces building
 c)    0.065 0.217 0.283 0.523 
Other control variables        
Male population per ha land      0.971  1.053   
     (0.583) (0.636)   
Share of population 19-45 years          0.380 
         (0.088) 
Population density (pop per ha)    1.205  1.484  1.652  1.829 
    (0.919) (1.041) (1.173) (1.187) 
Primary school in village    0.857  0.961    0.987 
Newspaper in village          0.052 
Drinking water connection     0.416  0.455    0.896 
Electricity  connection    0.104 0.247   0.922 
Doctor  available    0.169 0.338   0.442 
Credit available
 d).    0.901 0.922   0.909 
        
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Standard deviations in parentheses where appropriate. 
2. 
a) The net immigration rate relates to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2001. 
3. 
b) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice (mean computed over 
those villages, i.e. 70 out of 77). 
4. 
c) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes (mean computed over those villages, i.e. 46 
out of 77). 
5. 
d) The ‘credit available’ variable is here shown for the periods ‘past 20 years’, ‘past 10 years’ and in 
2001.  
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Table 2 
The effect of technology on development 
OLS and FE regressions 
 
   
  OLS regressions. Dependent Variable: Share of stone houses in 2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Irrigation  0.379      0.303  0.191 
1995
 a)  (0.066)***      (0.097)***  (0.069)*** 
Fertilizer    0.395         
1995    (0.046)***        
Pesticides     0.313       
1995     (0.050)***         
Improved      0.304      
seeds  1995      (0.060)***      
F.,  P.  &  S.        0.204  0.234 
1995
 c)        (0.097)**  (0.069)*** 
Terraces      0.265     
1995
 b)       (0.087)***     
Emigration        0.364   
1990-2001       (1.463)   
Male  pop.         0.039 
per  ha.  1995          (0.027) 
Population         0.361 
share  19-45          (0.261) 
Prim.  school         0.080 
1980          (0.083) 
Drink.  water         0.171 
conn.  1990          (0.060)*** 
Constant  0.185 0.062 0.082 0.149 0.194  0.101  -0.181 
  (0.036)*** (0.022)*** (0.028)*** (0.038)*** (0.044)***  (0.045)***  (0.147) 
R
2  0.356 0.394 0.204 0.252 0.185  0.536  0.620 
N  70 77 77 77 46  46  70 
           
FE regressions. Dependent Variable: Share of stone houses
 d) 
  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13)   
Irrigation
 a)  0.190      0.143   
  (0.031)***      (0.127)***   
Fertilizer    0.139        
    (0.026)***         
Pesticides     0.097         
     (0.018)***        
Improved       0.145       
seeds       (0.019)***       
F., P. & S.            0.127   
         (0.029)***   
Terraces
 b)      0.072  0.040   
       (0.013)***  (0.016)**   
R
2  0.238 0.256 0.167 0.236 0.076  0.425   
N  280 308 308 308 184  160   
           
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) Information about irrigation is only available in villages cultivating sawah rice. 
4. 
b) Terraces are only relevant for villages with steep slopes. 
5. 
c) ‘F., P. & S.’ stands for the simultaneous use of fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds. 
6. 
d) In the FE regressions stone houses and technology in 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001 are used.   20
Table 3 




  Dependent Variable: Net immigration rate of households between 1980 and 1990 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share  steep  -0.114     -0.114  -0.124 
slopes  (0.058)*     (0.063)*  (0.060)** 
Years  to  last    0.002    0.002  
drought    (0.001)*    (0.001)  
Ln  altitude     0.004   0.024  
above  sea     (0.011)   (0.021)  
Access.  by      0.059  0.045  
car  in  1980      (0.032)*  (0.038)  
Pop.  density  -0.006 -0.004  0.000 -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 
1980  (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.019 (0.017) 
Drink.  water        -0.026 
conn.  1990        (0.032) 
Electricity        0.068 
conn.  1990        (0.049) 
Constant 0.047  0.009  -0.008  -0.001    0.053 
  (0.028)* (0.039) (0.073) (0.029)    (0.030)* 
R
2  0.053 0.020 0.001 0.048 0.111 0.087 
N  77 77 77 77 77 77 
        
Dependent Variable: Ln village population size in 1980 
  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)   
Share  steep  -0.268     0.166  
slopes  (0.339)     (0.313)  
Years  to  last    0.003    -0.004  
drought    (0.008)    (0.007)  
Ln  altitude     -0.470   -0.382   
above  sea     (0.089)***   (0.099)***  
Access.  by      0.668  0.392  
car  in  1980      (0.163)***  (0.186)**  
Constant  6.335 6.267 9.230 5.891 8.457   
  (0.103)*** (0.118)*** (0.556)*** (0.126)*** (0.677)***   
R
2  0.009 0.001 0.286 0.188 0.331   
N  77 77 77 77 77   
         
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
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Table 4 
The effect of migration on land rights 
OLS, Probit, FE and IV regressions 
 
  Land rights in 1990  Land rights
. 









  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Immigration 0.988  4.003 0.936  0.584 
(1980-1990)  (0.334)*** (1.664)** (0.353)** (0.280)** 
Ln pop.  0.304  1.019  0.314  0.596 
(1980)  (0.055)*** (0.278)*** (0.059)*** (0.144)*** 
Prim. school      -0.165   
1980     (0.125)   
Credit avail.      0.143   
past 20 y.     (0.180)   
Constant -1.564  -6.973  -1.613  -3.471 
  (0.338)*** (1.799)*** (0.374)*** (0.958)*** 
R
2  0.295  0.316  0.185 
N  77 77 77 231 
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3. 
a) In the FE regressions land rights status and population in 1990, 1995 and 2001 are used. The net 
migration rate relates to the periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2001.  22
Table 5 
The effect of land rights on technology  
OLS, Probit, and Fixed Effects Regression 
 
 
Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995 
  OLS regression  Probit regression 
  Irrigation
a) Fertilizer  Pesticides Imp.  Seed. Terraces
b) Irrigation
 a) Fertilizer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Land  rights  0.445 0.369 0.323 0.244 0.294  1.205  1.170 
1990 (0.114)***  (0.094)***  (0.078)***  (0.114)**  (0.164)*  (0.335)***  (0.368)*** 
Constant  0.209 0.520 0.640 0.460 0.206  -0.809  0.050 
  (0.063)*** (0.072)*** (0.069)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)***  (0.217)***  (0.178) 
R
2  0.198 0.136 0.128 0.055 0.082     
N  70 77 77 77 46  70 77 
           
  Dependant variables: Technology use in 1995  Dep. Variables: Technology use in 
2001 
  Probit  OLS regression  OLS regression 
  Terraces
 b)  Irrigation
 a)  Fertilizer Terraces
 b)  Irrigation
 a)  Fertilizer  Terraces
 b) 
  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Land  rights  0.821 0.376 0.322 0.274 0.309  0.321  0.293 
1990 (0.441)*  (0.116)***  (0.093)***  (0.187)  (0.133)**  (0.110)***  (0.172)* 
Prim.  School   0.119  -0.059 0.049       
1980   (0.145) (0.139) (0.184)       
Credit avail.    0.317  0.438  0.231       
past 10 y.    (0.093)***  (0.188)**  (0.086)**       
Newspaper    0.463 0.207  -0.005      
available   (0.121)***  (0.095)**  (0.411)       
Extension w.          0.224  0.270  0.023 
2001         (0.136)  (0.117)**  (0.180) 
Constant  -0.821 -0.182  0.172 -0.049    0.320 0.340 
  (0.246) (0.155) (0.225) (0.184)    (0.098)***  (0.130)** 
R
2   0.291  0.211  0.098  0.157  0.258  0.091 
N  46 70 77 46 70  77 46 
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Table 6 
Geography, Technology and Economic Development: IV Regression 
 
  Growth (95-01)  Income Level (2001) 
  (1) (2) 
Second Stage    
Technology: Seeds, 





Primary school 1980  -0.002  0.016 
 (0.007)  (0.153) 
Water access 1980  0.007  0.099 
 (0.005)  (0.087) 
Constant -0.003  -0.116 
 (0.008)  (0.150) 
First Stage: Technology     
Primary school 1980  0.061  0.061 
 (0.154)  (0.154) 
Water access 1980  0.078  0.077 
 (0.143)  (0.143) 
Ln altitude  -0.0003  -0.0003 
above sea  (0.0002)*  (0.0002)* 
Number of years to   0.010  0.010 
last drought  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
Access. by  0.271  0.271 
car in 1980  (0.133)**  (0.133)** 
Share of fields on   0.167  0.167 
steep slopes  (0.218)  (0.218) 
Constant 0.432  0.432 
 (0.301)*  (0.301)* 
N  73 73 
    
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
2.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
3.  Technology in the first stage refers to the share of villages having adopted the package of improved 
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides in 1995.     24
Table 7 
Determinants of Deforestation 
 
  Forest Loss (80-01)*  Forest Loss (80-01) 
  (1) (2) 
Geography    












Demography    






Technology    
Labor-Saving: Hand-





Land-Saving: Change in 















Economic Development    











N  70 70 
R2  0.50 0.49 
 
Source: CRC STORMA A3 Village Survey. 
Notes: 
4.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
5.  Variable explanations see Section 4. 
6.  A positive coefficient means that this factor contributed to higher rates of deforestation.   
 
Kommentar [I2]: These effects 
are very small, is that really in ln. 
Kommentar [I3]: There are only 
three villages with a hand tractor in 
1980, this is a bit problematic. Is it 
possible to use “plough”. This 
would still be labor-saving 
compared to a hoe. 